The Solow model, poverty traps, and the foreign aid debate. by Snowdon,  Brian.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
04 March 2010
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Snowdon, Brian. (2009) ’The Solow model, poverty traps, and the foreign aid debate.’, History of political
economy., 41 (Supplement 1). pp. 241-262.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2009-026
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  
 
Durham Research Online 
 
Deposited in DRO: 
03 March 2010 
 
Peer-review status: 
Peer-reviewed 
 
Publication status: 
Published version 
 
Citation for published item: 
Snowdon, Brian. (2009) 'The Solow model, poverty traps, and the foreign aid debate.', 
History of political economy., 41 (Supplement 1). pp. 241-262. 
 
Further information on publisher’s website: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2009-026 
 
Copyright statement: 
Copyright 2009 by Duke University Press 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use policy 
 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior 
permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that : 
 
 a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 a link is made to the metadata record in DRO 
 the full-text is not changed in any way 
 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. 
 
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom 
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 2975 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk 
The Solow Model, Poverty Traps, 
and the Foreign Aid Debate
Brian Snowdon
The neoclassical model is still the most useful theory of growth 
we have. It will continue to be the fi rst growth model taught 
to students and the fi rst growth model used by policy analysts.
—Gregory Mankiw, “The Growth of Nations” (1995)
The 1940s and 1950s were an exciting and remarkably productive period 
in the fi elds of economic development and economic growth. A rich and 
prolifi c literature featured some of the most infl uential and well-known 
contributions in the history of economics. Discussions of economic devel-
opment were dominated by “Big Ideas” relating to balanced growth, low-
level traps, vicious circles, cumulative causation, dualism, savings ratios, big 
push, leading sectors, elasticity pessimism, import substitution, economic 
planning, take-offs into self-sustained growth, and foreign aid require-
ments (see Meier 2005).
Against this background, by far the most infl uential and durable con-
tribution to the analysis of economic growth was Robert Solow’s 1956 
paper, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” which estab-
lished the benchmark neoclassical growth model. Solow’s landmark paper 
remains “one of those rare pieces which quite literally changed the face of 
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economics and launched a thousand theoretical ships” (Blinder 1989). One 
important theoretical ship that has recently set sail again is the idea that 
some very poor countries appear to be caught in a poverty trap requiring a 
“big push” from foreign aid in order to escape. A case in point is a 2004 
article by Jeffrey Sachs and colleagues; as discussed later in this article, 
Sachs et al. make extensive use of a modifi ed Solow model to provide theo-
retical support for increasing the fl ow of foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). There is a strong similarity between Sachs et al. 2004 and Rich-
ard Nelson’s infl uential paper from 1956, the same year in which Solow’s 
contribution appeared. Nelson’s model of a “low level equilibrium trap” 
persuaded many economists that developing countries would need sub-
stantial infl ows of external assistance if they were to escape extreme pov-
erty and begin the process of sustained growth.
The burgeoning contemporary research into the causes of economic 
growth, poverty traps, and convergence clubs, as well as the need to iden-
tify the deeper determinants of substantial cross-country differentials in 
income per capita, has brought the Solow model, and modifi cations thereof, 
into the heart of the contemporary development debate after decades of 
neglect in this fi eld. This article reviews and provides a critical commen-
tary on the literature relating to the Solow model, economic development, 
poverty traps, and the case for foreign aid as a solution to the SSA growth 
tragedy.
The Solow Model and the Economics 
of Development
The importance of economic growth as a necessary condition for sus-
tained improvements in human material welfare and poverty reduction is 
confi rmed by numerous empirical studies (Dollar and Kraay 2002). When 
it comes to investigating the proximate causes of growth, the dynamics 
of transition to steady states, and the potential for catch-up and conver-
gence between low- and high-income per capita countries, Solow’s model, 
together with subsequent extensions and refi nements, has proved an invalu-
able and adaptable framework of analysis. The model is parsimonious, 
rigorous, and fl exible, and provides many useful insights into the causes 
of economic growth (Mankiw 1995). And yet, although the neoclassical 
growth model was central to the 1960s growth accounting debates relating 
to the high-income developed nations, strangely, and in sharp contrast to 
the highly visible Harrod-Domar (H-D) model, compared with today, the 
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Solow growth model is largely inconspicuous in the mainstream develop-
ment literature during the period 1956–85. For example, in the classic and 
widely used collections of readings edited by Amar Agarwala and Sampat 
Singh (1971, fi rst published in 1958), and Ian Livingstone (1971), there is 
no discussion of the Solow model. Further evidence that the Solow model 
played little part in the early development literature comes from Diana 
Hunt, who in her 1989 survey notes that “neoclassical growth theory is not 
surveyed here, partly because it did not form part of the intellectual heri-
tage of development economists in the 1940s and early 1950s, but also 
because it has had no appreciable infl uence on development economics” 
(34; emphasis added).
Why did development economics and growth theory evolve along sepa-
rate paths for almost three decades in the post-1956 period? Building on 
Paul Krugman’s (1992) insightful analysis, Solow (1999, 275) offers the 
following explanation:
On the whole the personality types in the profession who became inter-
ested in economic development were not model builders. They were col-
lectors of data and generalizers from rough empirical data, like Simon 
Kuznets; or they were like Ted Schultz, really deeply into underdevel-
oped agriculture, or they were people interested in history and back-
wardness for its own sake. That sort of temperament is not suited to 
model building. Growth theory par excellence, yielded to model build-
ing. So even Arthur Lewis thought of his 1954 paper as a minor sideline 
to his book The Theory of Economic Growth (1955). The people who 
got interested in the theory of economic growth were interested in model 
building.
Today the situation is very different. Since the mid-1980s, interest in the 
Solow model, and model building in general, among development econ-
omists has revived. Although the H-D model still fi nds a place in most 
development textbooks, it rarely warrants much more than a passing com-
ment in modern macro or growth textbooks (e.g., compare the brief dis-
cussion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004 with the extensive treatment in 
Jones 1975). Unlike the years of “high development theory” (Krugman 
1992), the Solow model now receives extensive treatment in most text-
books on economic development (e.g., compare Higgins 1959 with Perkins, 
Radelet, and Lindauer 2006). In large part this can be attributed to the ver-
satility of Solow’s model and the insights it provides on the convergence-
divergence debate (Islam 2003). Although dominated by the Solow and 
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1. Mauro Boianovsky (2010) defi nes capital fundamentalism as “the notion that physical 
capital accumulation, instead of technical change or investment in human capital, determines 
the rate of growth of income per capita.”
Romer models, another notable change is the welcome and growing ten-
dency in macro and growth textbooks to give increasing attention to the 
“deeper” political economy determinants of growth and development 
(see, e.g., Acemoglu 2008).
What were the main infl uences that led Solow (2007, 4) into the research 
that culminated in his 1956 “contribution to the theory of economic 
growth”? According to Solow (1999), he became interested in growth for 
three main reasons. First, in the early 1950s many economists were becom-
ing increasingly absorbed in the daunting economic problems facing the 
developing countries. However, in terms of his own research, Solow became 
“passively” rather than “actively” interested in economic development (“I 
got to thinking about development issues and I had read Arthur Lewis”). 
Second, Solow’s linear programming research with Robert Dor man and 
Paul Samuelson (1958) stimulated his thinking about intertemporal opti-
mization and economic growth. Third, Solow (1999, 273–74) was “sus-
picious of the Harrod-Domar model. . . . I thought there must be a way 
of modelling growth that does not have the knife edge property of the 
Harrod-Domar model.”
While Solow never intended his model to address the specifi c prob-
lems facing developing countries, it does provide a coherent framework 
for thinking about the connection between growth, capital accumulation, 
and economic development. Capital accumulation was already central in 
the 1950s development models of Harrod-Domar, Walt Rostow, Ragnar 
Nurkse, and Arthur Lewis (Meier 2005). However, when there are dimin-
ishing returns to the accumulation of capital, a policy emphasis on increas-
ing investment-GDP ratios will not lead to sustained economic growth; 
rather, long-run growth is driven by (exogenous) technological progress. 
Therefore it is hardly surprising that Solow’s one-sector neoclassical growth 
model failed to have a substantial impact on the development literature, 
given this was an era of development thinking heavily infl uenced by dual-
sector models, surplus labor, structuralism, and “capital fundamentalism” 
(King and Levine 1994).1
In his thought-provoking tale of “economists’ misadventures in the trop-
ics,” Bill Easterly (2001) provides a stinging critique of “capital fundamen-
talism.” Because of diminishing returns, Solow’s growth model contains 
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the “surprising” result that investment is not the key to long-run growth, 
even if it plays a role in the transition to the steady-state growth path. How-
ever, this “shocker” failed to infl uence the thinking of the development 
“experts” in the major international fi nancial institutions who mistakenly 
continue to view the “accumulation of productive assets” as the “founda-
tion of economic growth.”
Augmenting the Solow Model: 
From Solow to Romer, Barro, and Mankiw
The revival of interest in growth theory and empirics since the mid-1980s 
has had a signifi cant infl uence on the economic development literature as 
well as reigniting interest in the Solow model as a versatile framework for 
investigating the issue of convergence. While part of this revival of interest 
in growth analysis refl ected the return of macroeconomic stabilization in 
the developed economies during the 1980s, it also refl ects the intellectual 
stimulus provided by the new endogenous growth theories. Even though 
these models were more about developed than developing countries, in his 
seminal paper Paul Romer (1986) highlights the growing body of evidence 
supporting the lack of convergence in per capita incomes between devel-
oped and developing countries. This was a signifi cant contributing factor 
infl uencing Romer’s quest to construct a growth model based on increasing 
returns. Indeed, the existence of convergence and divergence clubs is one 
of the key stylized facts of international economic development that has 
allowed the Solow model to become a central component in the debate on 
the evolution of world inequality.
In response to Romer’s challenge to the conventional neoclassical the-
ory of growth, Greg Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil (1992) devel-
oped their “modifi ed” Solow model that can explain international differ-
ences in growth rates as the result of convergence to different steady states 
and is consistent with the idea that “the accumulation of capital broadly 
defi ned is the key to international differences in economic growth rates” 
(Mankiw 1995, 308). However, the biggest push toward integrating the 
modern analysis of growth and development was given by Robert Barro’s 
(1991) highly infl uential cross-country regression paper. Barro’s cross-
country empirical work was fi rmly embedded in the extended Solow neo-
classical model; a major fi nding from his research is that the “neoclassical 
model’s central idea of conditional convergence receives strong support 
from the data.” As Barro (1997, x) observes, “It is surely an irony that one 
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of the lasting contributions of endogenous growth theory is that it stimu-
lated empirical work that demonstrated the explanatory power of the neo-
classical growth model.” While Solow (1999) remains “very suspicious” 
of cross-country regression results, the new empirical literature focus-
ing on the convergence issue undoubtedly created a synergy between the 
growth and development literature and was a major infl uence in placing 
the Solow model at the heart of modern discussions of economic develop-
ment, including the SSA “growth tragedy” (Mankiw 1995; Snowdon and 
Vane 2005).
The Sub-Saharan Growth Tragedy
The lack of signifi cant progress in SSA is the outstanding development 
failure of the last quarter of the twentieth century relative to the expecta-
tions and aspirations present at the time of decolonization. This problem 
remains the greatest development challenge facing the world in the twenty-
fi rst century (Easterly and Levine 1997; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003; 
Sala-i-Martin 2006). As Angus Maddison’s (2004) data reveal, although 
during the relatively stable period, 1950–73, GDP per capita growth in 
Africa was a respectable 2 percent, this fell to a dismal 0.19 percent for the 
period 1972–2001. This is in sharp contrast to the well-documented “mir-
acle” growth experienced by the East Asian economies.
The reasons for the poor economic performance of most of SSA since 
the decolonization period remain highly controversial. Paul Collier and 
Jan Gunning (1999) consider several plausible explanations:
 1.  adverse external infl uences and conditions including the legacy 
of colonialism, slavery (Nunn 2008), “Cold War” politics, and the 
restrictive trade policies of high income countries;
 2.  terms of trade volatility and heavy dependence on a small number 
of primary exports;
 3.  damaging economic policies, including protectionism, excessive reg-
ulations, fi scal profl igacy, incentives to “rent seeking” and “directly 
unproductive” behavior, hostility toward FDI, and excessive public 
ownership and statism;
 4.  unfavorable demographic factors, especially rapid population 
growth;
 5.  geographical constraints, relating to climate, soils, topography and 
disease ecology, the “natural resource curse,” and the problems faced 
by countries landlocked by hostile neighbors;
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 6.  internal political instability, authoritarianism, corruption, bureau-
cratic ineffi ciency, poor governance and lack of accountable dem-
ocratic institutions;
 7.  ethnic diversity, absence of trust and lack of social capital;
 8.  lack of adequate physical and social infrastructure, failure to pro-
vide secure property rights and contract enforcement.
While growth theory and the experience of East Asia suggest that SSA 
countries have enormous potential for catch-up and convergence, this 
potential is unlikely to materialize in countries with inadequate growth-
supporting political and economic institutions. However, Jeffrey Sachs 
(2005, 2008) has recently become the leading advocate of the argument 
that SSA is caught in a “poverty trap” that requires a “big push” to escape 
via a substantial increase in foreign aid fl ows. Moreover, by using modifi -
cations to the Solow model to make their case, Sachs et al. (2004) illustrate 
just how versatile the neoclassical theoretical framework can be when dis-
cussing a major issue in development theory and policy.
The Foreign Aid Controversy: 
From Harrod-Domar to the Solow Model
One long-running controversy in development economics, where the Solow 
model has now become central to the debate, relates to the role that foreign 
aid can play in helping low-income countries escape from extreme poverty. 
While economists agree that a necessary condition for the elimination of 
extreme poverty is sustained economic growth, the idea that a substantial 
increase in the fl ow of foreign aid, to regions such as SSA, is necessary to 
promote such growth remains highly controversial. Indeed the debate relat-
ing to the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting growth and develop-
ment remains plagued with problems relating to causality, measurement, 
and ideology (Friedman 1958; Bauer 1971; Easterly 2006b; Riddell 2007).
During the first two “development decades” (1950–70) the case for 
increasing foreign aid to stimulate economic growth and escape from a 
low-level equilibrium initially centered on the H-D model rather than the 
Solow model. The “capital fundamentalism” of the H-D model became a 
key ingredient within the framework of development planning and the 
estimation of aid requirements. The implications of this simple growth 
model were dramatic and somewhat reassuring. The problem of generating 
an increase in economic growth could be achieved by simply increasing 
the resources devoted to capital accumulation.
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The familiar H-D growth equation, G = s/v, simply states that the growth 
rate (G) of GDP is jointly determined by the savings ratio (s) and the incre-
mental capital-output ratio (ICOR = v). The higher the savings (investment) 
ratio and the lower the ICOR, the faster will an economy grow. For exam-
ple, if a developing country desired to achieve a target growth rate of per 
capita income, Δ(Y/P), of 2 percent per annum (i.e., a growth target that 
will ensure that living standards double every thirty-fi ve years), and popu-
lation (P) is estimated to be growing at n = 2 percent per annum, then 
economic planners could calculate the savings rate required to achieve a 
target rate of aggregate GDP growth (G*) equal to 4 percent according to 
equation (1).
G* = [Δ(Y/P) + n] = s*/v. (1)
If v = 4, this implies that G* will be realized only with a desired savings 
ratio (s*) of 0.16, or 16 percent of GDP (i.e., G*v = s*). If s* > s, there is 
a “savings (foreign exchange) gap,” and planners would need to devise 
policies to plug this gap (Chenery and Strout 1966). If domestic sources 
of fi nance proved inadequate to achieve G*, then foreign aid could fi ll 
the savings gap. As (2) illustrates, aid requirements (Ar) could simply be 
calculated as s* − s = Ar.
G* = [s + Ar]/v1 = s*/v.  (2)
It is assumed in such formulations that the boost given to growth by an 
injection of aid resources will eventually cause a jump in the domestic 
savings rate such that self-sustaining growth is achieved, thereby ending 
the need for further aid infl ows.
However, a major weakness of the H-D approach is the assumption of 
a stable ICOR. Aid infl ows are likely to raise the ICOR (lower the produc-
tivity of capital) as a result of channeling aid into easy-to-monitor, large, 
prestigious projects that will stand as monuments to the generosity of the 
politically motivated donors (Griffi n 1970). Economists soon became 
aware of a second major fl aw in the “aid requirements” or “fi nancing gap” 
model. The model assumes that aid infl ows are channeled into investment, 
one-to-one. But it quickly became apparent that foreign aid, with the objec-
tive of closing the savings gap, did not necessarily boost total savings and 
in many cases reduced domestic savings (Easterly 2006b). This is equiv-
alent to a proportion (αc) of the aid infl ow being consumed, that is, aid is 
highly fungible (see Griffi n 1970; Boone 1996). As equation (3) illustrates, 
if aid has a negative impact on the ICOR, and a signifi cant proportion of 
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the aid is consumed, the impact of aid on growth is substantially reduced 
and could even be negative.
G = [s + (1 − αc)Ar]/v2, (3)
where αc is large, and v2 > v1. In this “pessimistic” scenario, G* is unlikely 
to be achieved via attempts to boost domestic savings with infl ows of 
foreign aid (Snowdon 2007).
Ignoring these early doubts, the case for increasing foreign aid has 
reemerged as a major international policy issue and is linked, via modi-
fi cations to the standard Solow model, to the idea that some developing 
countries are trapped in a permanent condition of poverty.
Poverty Traps, Foreign Aid, 
and the Sachs-Solow Model
In a recent infl uential paper, Jeffrey Sachs et al. (2004) argue that most 
SSA countries are caught in a “poverty trap” that is heavily infl uenced by 
geographically rooted low agricultural productivity, heavy disease bur-
dens, and relative physical isolation. In such circumstances, the optimistic 
neoclassical vision that market forces combined with improved gover-
nance can remedy the development problem in many very poor countries, 
irrespective of their initial poverty, is rejected. A practical solution requires 
targeted investments, large in scale and fi nanced by foreign aid, in infra-
structure, disease control, and selective measures to promote a “green revo-
lution” in agriculture.
That poor countries can be caught in a poverty trap is of course an old 
idea in economics, dating back at least to 1798 and the work of Thomas 
Malthus. During the 1950s this idea was revived by Ragnar Nurkse (1953) 
as the “vicious circle of poverty” model, and also in the infl uential paper 
by Richard Nelson (1956), whose theory of a “low level equilibrium trap” 
was used to explain persistent poverty. Nelson suggests that “foreign assis-
tance, together with internal change, can play an important role in boost-
ing an economy from the hold of the trap” (904).
Poverty traps (multiple equilibria) represent self-reinforcing ineffi cient 
steady-state equilibria at low levels of per capita income and can arise 
from a variety of sources, including both market and institutional failure 
(Azariadis and Stachurski 2005; Azariadis 2006). Paul Collier (2007) 
identifi es four signifi cant “traps” that ensnare the “bottom billion” of the 
world’s population, namely, “internal confl ict traps,” “natural resource 
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traps,” “landlocked by bad neighbour traps,” and “bad governance traps.” 
One of the simplest and best-known poverty-trap mechanisms runs from 
extreme poverty to low rates of domestic saving and capital accumulation, 
to low or negative rates of growth of productivity (Ben-David 1998). In an 
open economy setting, with no restrictions on capital mobility, we should 
expect to see, ceteris paribus, capital fl owing from rich to poor countries, 
attracted by higher potential returns, thereby accelerating capital accumu-
lation. However, in reality, poor infrastructure, high rates of corruption, 
and political instability, by lowering the risk-adjusted rate of return to capi-
tal, discourage such FDI fl ows, thereby explaining the “Lucas paradox” 
(Lucas 1990).
Another potential poverty-trap mechanism arises from the ineffi cient 
operation of shallow fi nancial markets in poor countries. Because credit 
and insurance markets are plagued by informational imperfections, risk-
averse lenders require collateral before they are willing to make loans. 
Unfortunately, the poor obviously lack assets that they can use as collateral 
and remain credit constrained. Costas Azariadis and Allan Drazen (1990) 
argue that credit rationing, because of a lack of “fi nancial depth,” reduces 
investment in human capital with important adverse consequences for 
economic growth (De Soto 2000).
Sachs et al. (2004) argue that the solution to SSA’s poverty trap lies in 
the initiation of a temporary “big push” on the investment front leading to 
a “step” increase in underlying productivity and a take-off into sustained 
growth. Given the nature and dynamics of the poverty trap, this big push 
requires substantial external assistance in the form of a Marshall Plan for 
SSA. To support their case Sachs et al. use modifi ed versions of the Solow 
neoclassical growth model that include “critical thresholds . . . that must 
be reached before the forces of standard competitive theory take hold” 
(Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff 2006).
The standard Solow growth model is built around the familiar neo-
classical aggregate production function (4) and focuses on the proximate 
causes of growth:
Y = At F(K, L),  (4)
where Y is real output, K is capital, L is the labour input, and At is a mea-
sure of exogenously determined “technology.” The aggregate production 
function is assumed to be “well-behaved,” that is, it satisfi es the follow-
ing three “Inada” conditions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2005). First, for 
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all values of K > 0 and L > 0, F(•) exhibits positive but diminishing mar-
ginal returns with respect to both capital and labor, that is, ∂F/∂K > 0, 
∂2F/∂K2 < 0, ∂F/∂L > 0, and ∂2F/∂L2 < 0. Second, the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale such that F (λ K, λL) = λY, that is, rais-
ing inputs by λ will also increase aggregate output by λ. Letting λ = 1/L 
yields Y/L = AtF (K,/L,1/L). This assumption allows (4) to be written 
down in intensive form as (5) where y = output per worker (Y/L) and k = 
capital per worker (K/L):
y = At f(k), where f ′(k) > 0, and f ′′(k) < 0 for all k. (5)
Equation (5) states that, for a given technology (At), output per worker is 
a positive function of the capital-labor ratio and exhibits diminishing 
returns. Third, as the capital-labor ratio approaches infi nity (k → ∞) the 
marginal product of capital (MPK) approaches zero; as the capital-labor 
ratio approaches zero, the marginal product of capital tends toward 
infi nity (MPK → ∞). The standard diagrammatic representation of the 
Solow model embraces the intensive form of the neoclassical aggregate 
production function that satisfi es the above conditions. In a recent com-
ment on these conditions, Sachs recalls that it took him twenty years to 
fully appreciate the implications of these mathematical properties of the 
neoclassical production function (Snowdon 2007).
How does capital accumulate? Where s = the domestic savings rate, n = 
the rate of population growth, and δ = the rate of depreciation, and dk/dt = 
capital deepening, then the well-known fundamental differential equation 
of the Solow model is given by (6):
dk/dt = sAf(k)—(n + δ)k. (6)
The capital widening term (n + δ)k indicates the investment (saving) per 
worker necessary to hold the capital-labor ratio constant. In the Solow 
model, as long as sAf(k) > (n + δ)k, output per worker will grow. When 
sAf(k) = (n + δ)k, an economy has reached a steady-state equilibrium.
Sachs et al. (2004) argue that the textbook neoclassical growth model 
is a “special case” and the actual behavior of an economy at very low lev-
els of output per worker is very different from the one portrayed in the 
standard neoclassical model in three important ways: 
 1.  While in the conventional Solow model the MPK is nearly infi nite 
at very low levels k, in reality, because production processes require 
a “minimum threshold of capital” (kT), MPK is also low in poor 
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2. Solow (1956, 71) notes that “the steady adjustment of capital and output to a state of 
balanced growth comes about because of the way I have drawn the productivity curve.” He 
also considers the impact of a “variable saving rate” (87–89) and “variable population growth” 
(90–91).
3. I am grateful to an anonymous referee who drew my attention to Buttrick’s paper.
countries. Therefore, without the presence of basic infrastructure 
(roads, human capital, etc.) the productivity of small increments 
of k will be negligible. In fi gure 1, dk/dt only becomes positive 
above point kT, and at low levels of k there are increasing returns 
to capital accumulation due to a nonconvexity in the production 
function.
 2.  As shown in fi gure 2, when k is very low, the savings rate is likely 
to be low, or even negative, because very poor people need to con-
sume all of their income just to survive. However, saving increases 
with higher levels on output (income) per worker (capita), form-
ing an “S” shaped function. With sAf(k) less steep than (n + δ)k 
at low levels of k, then dk/dt is again negative below point kT 
(Solow, 1956, also discusses alternative confi gurations of the sav-
ings function).
 3.  A third factor likely to prevent capital accumulation at low levels of 
k is rapid population growth. There is a strong correlation between 
low income per capita and fertility rates, and poor people, for per-
fectly rational reasons, aim to have large numbers of children. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates a Solow model with a demographic trap. Note how 
the (n + δ)k function is very steep at low levels of k. Therefore dk/dt 
is again negative below kT.
While Sachs et al. argue that in very poor countries the “capital thresh-
olds, savings traps, and demographic traps” are all likely to interact to pro-
duce a powerful “poverty trap,” throughout their discussion they refer only 
to the “standard neoclassical model,” never mentioning or citing Solow’s 
1956 paper. In doing so they miss the opportunity to note that Solow also 
considered nonstandard outcomes.2 Indeed, as early as 1958, John But-
trick’s Quarterly Journal of Economics paper demonstrated the relevance 
to development economics of the possibility of multiple equilibria in the 
Solow model.3
While the infl uential arguments of Sachs have provided a rallying point 
for the pro-aid lobby, many economists remain unconvinced that foreign 
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aid is either necessary or suffi cient for successful growth and develop-
ment. Aart Kraay and Claudio Raddatz (2007) fi nd little evidence support-
ing the existence of poverty traps, in their extensive survey of the litera-
ture. Azariadis and Jan Stachurski (2005) note that there are a large number 
of self-reinforcing mechanisms that can interact and potentially cause a 
poverty trap. In such cases, policy shocks will have “large and permanent 
Figure 1 The Solow model with a minimum capital stock threshold. 
Adapted and extended from Sachs et al. 2004.
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effects if one-off interventions can cause the formation of new and bet-
ter equilibria.” However, they also recognize that engineering such an 
outcome to achieve a more effi cient equilibria in practice is very problem-
atic, given the perverse infl uence of the prevailing structure of incen-
tives in many developing countries, together with problems of corruption 
and the lack of information facing policymakers.
There is considerable variation in the motivation and behavior of aid 
donors, and the research of Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) con-
fi rms that the criteria for bilateral aid allocations are dominated as much 
Figure 2 The Solow model with a savings trap. Adapted and extended 
from Sachs et al. 2004.
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by political and strategic considerations as they are by considerations of 
economic development. Alesina and Beatrice Weder (2002) demonstrate 
that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more 
foreign aid than highly corrupt governments, and Jacob Svennson (2000) 
also provides evidence that infl ows of foreign aid are associated with 
increased corruption and rent-seeking behavior, especially in countries 
where there are competing social groups.
According to the critics of aid, “capital fundamentalism” and the 
“aid-fi nanced investment fetish” have led policymakers up the wrong 
Figure 3 The Solow model with a demographic trap. Adapted and 
extended from Sachs et al. 2004.
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path in their “elusive quest for growth.” Indeed, Easterly (2006a, 2006b) 
argues that although the H-D model died long ago in academia, it is still 
infl uential among economists working in the major international fi nan-
cial institutions who continue to employ the H-D–Chenery-Strout meth-
odology to calculate the investment and aid requirements needed for 
specifi c countries to achieve their growth targets. However, Easterly argues 
that the evidence that aid fl ows into investment on a one-for-one basis, 
and that there is a fi xed linear relationship between growth and invest-
ment in the short run, is “soundly rejected” (see also Burnside and Dol-
lar 2000; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2000; Rajan and Subrama-
nian 2005).
To date, the “top down,” “mega reform,” planned administrative approach 
to solving the problem of world poverty involving large increases in the 
fl ow of foreign aid has not been a success (Easterly 2006a). What is the 
alternative? Easterly advocates a piecemeal gradualist “bottom up” approach 
in the spirit of Edmund Burke and Karl Popper. However, Easterly does 
concede that aid could be useful in achieving more modest objectives than 
Rostovian “take-offs” into “self sustaining growth,” if incentive structures 
at ground level were improved and if the existing bureaucratic fl aws within 
the international aid agencies could be corrected.
From Solow to the Fundamental 
Determinants of Growth
In the most recent wave of growth theory and empirics, modern political 
economy models have been used to investigate the deeper or fundamen-
tal determinants of growth, something the Solow model does not and was 
not designed to address. A major problem with formal growth models that 
focus on the proximate determinants of growth is that they necessarily 
ignore factors such as the infl uence of history, path dependency, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and the numerous political and economic bar-
riers to reform. Fortunately, recent political economy models of growth 
focus on factors such as the quality of governance, the origins of the legal 
system, ethnic diversity, social cohesion, democracy, trust, corruption, 
path dependency, political barriers, and institutions in general (Helpman 
2004; Acemoglu 2008). Consequently, some of the most exciting devel-
opments in recent years have been those emerging as a result of the 
remarkable coming together of the fi elds of economic growth, economic 
development, and economic history. This has led to several insightful 
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political economy contributions to our understanding of the deeper (fun-
damental) determinants of long-run economic growth and development. 
Key insights have emerged from the research of such scholars as Douglass 
North (2005), Dani Rodrik (2007), and Daron Acemoglu and James Rob-
inson (2006).
Although there is obviously a great deal of interaction among the 
numerous factors infl uencing growth, perhaps the most promising frame-
work for analyzing SSA’s growth tragedy is one that emphasizes the role 
of institutions and political constraints. Rodrik (2007) has emphasized 
the importance of embedding a market economy within a set of non-
market institutions and identifi es fi ve key institutions, namely, “property 
rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion; institutions for social insurance; and institutions for confl ict man-
agement.” However, it is important to emphasize that these institutions 
“are not uniquely determined,” and Rodrik rejects the discredited “neo-
liberal social-economic model” associated with the more extreme versions 
of the Washington Consensus.
While the World Bank (2002) is giving increasing emphasis to the 
growth-retarding impact of weak institutions, and many economists are 
now persuaded that the incentive structure created by the institutional 
environment must be a key ingredient that determines the success or fail-
ure of countries in their “elusive quest for growth,” there remains little 
consensus on the precise channels of causation running from institutions 
to economic growth. As Elhanan Helpman (2004) observes, “The study of 
institutions and their relation to economic growth is an enormous task on 
which only limited progress has been made so far.”
To understand the political roots of economic success remains a crucial 
research area for economists, and the recent work of Acemoglu and North, 
and their coresearchers, is making a substantial contribution in this area 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; North et al. 2007). A major problem facing 
almost all developing countries is how to make the formidably diffi cult 
transition from their current politico-economic status as “limited access 
orders” to becoming “open access orders” (North et al. 2007). Limited 
access orders are those where “social, economic, and political systems are 
based on limited entry and rent creation,” while open access orders are 
characterized by the rule of law and open competition in both the politi-
cal and economic spheres. While there may be leeway for aid to perform 
a role in the more “mature” limited-access societies, in fragile limited-
access orders aid infl ows could very well be highly destabilizing.
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Conclusion
Fifty years on, the idea that many low-income countries in SSA are caught 
in a poverty trap is once more popular among economists who advocate 
some form of global Marshall Plan to defeat poverty. Sachs et al. (2004) 
reject the orthodox Solow model as a useful framework of analysis for 
poor countries because its key assumptions rule out the possibility of a 
poverty trap. While the three poverty-trap mechanisms built into the 
Solow model and highlighted by Sachs have intellectual appeal and are 
theoretically plausible, the lack of any systematic empirical evidence sup-
porting them suggests that a very cautious response is appropriate to 
appeals for substantial increases in aid as a viable solution to SSA’s pov-
erty. There are numerous examples of countries (including the United 
Kingdom and United States) that have escaped from poverty via sustained 
growth where foreign aid has played little or no part. Furthermore, large 
infl ows of aid, of the volume envisaged by Sachs, are not a dominant fea-
ture of the thirteen countries that have sustained rapid growth during the 
last forty years discussed in the 2008 Commission on Growth and Devel-
opment Report (a commission, by the way, of which Bob Solow was a 
member).
The most signifi cant barriers to economic progress in much of SSA 
have their origin in the destructive dynamics of internal political confl ict 
combined with dysfunctional institutions and misguided economic poli-
cies, rather than minimum capital threshold, saving, and demographic pov-
erty traps. Ineffi cient institutions, created and perpetuated by elites, are a 
major barrier to progress in many developing countries. As economists we 
should not be surprised when aid fl owing into an environment dominated 
by mismanaged or corrupt institutions and inadequate governance fails to 
deliver a virtuous circle of enlightened reforms and the Holy Grail of sus-
tained economic growth. In reality, the economic history of the world has 
repeatedly demonstrated how political barriers prevent economic progress. 
Nowhere is this problem more acute than in SSA.
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